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Trading and Voting

David K. Musto and Bilge Yılmaz
University of Pennsylvania

Complete financial markets transform the political choice between
candidates with different redistribution policies. If redistribution policies do not affect aggregate wealth, then financial trade implies that
wealth considerations have no effect on voting and so do not affect
who wins. However, an election in which one candidate would redistribute results in redistribution, and redistribution is the same whether
or not he wins. Furthermore, he proposes, and if elected carries out,
more redistribution than he prefers. If redistribution policies do affect
aggregate wealth, then everybody expects more wealth if the candidate
with the higher aggregate-wealth policy wins.

Elections assign the right to design tax policies, so to consumers they
represent uncertainty over future wealth. An election pitting a candidate
who proposes to redistribute wealth against another who does not indicates one future state of the world in which the wealthy lose wealth
to the poor and another future state in which they do not. One implication of this uncertainty pertains to the election’s outcome: other
things equal, a voter chooses the candidate delivering him more wealth,
so the interaction of the tax policies with the wealth distribution decides
who wins. The literature has explored this implication extensively (see,
e.g., Myerson 1993; Persson and Tabellini 1994; Lizzeri and Persico
2000), including multiperiod models focusing on accumulating debt
(see, e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1990; Lizzeri 1999).
We are concerned here with a different implication, which can have
We thank Domenico Cuoco, Simon Gervais, Bob Inman, Antonio Merlo, Nicola Persico,
Tom Rietz, Nick Souleles, participants in the University of Pennsylvania’s Political Economy
seminar, two anonymous referees, and Fernando Alvarez, the editor, for helpful advice
and comments.
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strong implications for the first: consumers would respond to the wealth
uncertainty, as they do to other financial risks, in their demand for
financial instruments. If consumers can share the wealth risk by trading
election-contingent securities (e.g., paying one if the redistributionist
wins, zero if he loses) in a frictionless market, the outcome of the political process is quite different on all the important dimensions. The
probability that the redistributionist wins is different, the amount of
redistribution is different, and the timing of the redistribution is different too.
The intuition for this result is that the potential for redistribution
creates offsetting risks. The dollars that the wealthy lose to redistribution
match the dollars the poor gain, so the enthusiasm of the wealthy for
buying insurance against the redistributionist’s winning resembles the
enthusiasm of the poor for selling it. If voters can share this risk with
the state-contingent security, the equilibrium is full insurance; all consumers equalize wealth across the two states. This delivers both the result
that wealth redistribution occurs before the election, rather than during
or after, and also the result that wealth considerations do not determine
who wins the election. With wealth the same whether or not the redistributionist wins, voters refer to their nonwealth preferences when making their choices. In other words, an externality of frictionless financial
risk sharing is that ideological, and not pocketbook, concerns decide
who governs.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. Section I covers
the relevant background. Section II presents the model, Section III
solves and interprets the model, and Section IV summarizes and presents
a conclusion.
I.

Background

Consumers can vote themselves other people’s wealth. A candidate can
communicate that he would redistribute if elected, and a majority of
votes makes it happen. This would seem to have serious implications
for the distribution of wealth and the incentive to accumulate wealth
in the first place. When wealth is concentrated in a few voters, a candidate who favors redistribution would intuitively have an easy win over
a candidate who does not, and wealth would accordingly even out.
Consider a two-candidate race. Two candidates communicate how they
would govern, including how they would redistribute; then the vote
occurs and then the governing, including the redistribution. When the
candidates’ governing policies are endogenous, that is, they communicate whatever policies they want to communicate, not just the policies
that match their principles, the race becomes strategically interesting.
If candidates just care about winning and not redistribution per se, they
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will espouse redistribution anyway to buy votes (see, e.g., Myerson 1993).
Similarly, political parties with ideological motives are nonetheless motivated to buy votes with transfers (Dixit and Londregan 1996). Throughout the extensive literature on this subject (see Drazen [2000] for a
review), candidates’ redistribution policies are viewed as key to electoral
outcomes, being the major—or only—determinant of voters’ preference
orderings, and the candidates’ policy choices are analyzed from this
perspective.
Now consider the race from the consumers’ point of view. The candidates partition the future into two possible states, one for each outcome, and each consumer expects more wealth in one state than in the
other. So the election creates uncertainty over future wealth, and there
is an extensive literature on that subject, too. The standard analysis is
that consumers have strictly concave utility for wealth, so they are all
risk-averse at any wealth level; thus they would prefer to hedge uncertainty over future wealth by trading financial securities. The uncertainty
caused by a potential redistribution is well suited to such trade, for two
reasons. First, if wealth is simply redistributed, rather than created or
destroyed, then net redistribution is zero in each state. This suggests
that the demand for securities that hedge against a candidate’s winning
matches the supply. Second, the contingency that consumers want to
hedge is easily verifiable and therefore contractible.
In a complete and perfect capital market, consumers enjoy frictionless
and unlimited access to a security paying one if a candidate wins and
zero if he loses. In actuality, consumers enjoy at least some access. Securities contingent on the major U.S. elections trade on the Iowa Electronic Market, where there are no commissions but low position limits.1
Securities sensitive to, but not defined by, the major U.S. elections trade
without explicit position limits on the major exchanges. Examples include municipal bonds.2 Since financial market access is intuitively weak
for one side of this market, poor people,3 the result we find for complete
and perfect markets can be viewed as cautionary, a prediction of the
economy with easier access. And since some consumers might wish to
manipulate such a market should it exist, our results best represent an
economy in which manipulation is uneconomical or is outlawed.4
In summary, the existing literature on elections has not allowed for
1

Traders can spend up to $500 (see, e.g., Feder 2002).
See “Presidential Race Induces Creation of Index Strategies” (2000) for more examples.
3
One could, however, view municipal bonds as sales to rich people made on their behalf.
4
One source of manipulation is insider trading. Political insiders could not only buy
or sell on their information but also manipulate the market with strategic (potentially
false) announcements. The goal could be either to make money or to influence voters
through the market price. Another source is wealthy consumers; if campaign contributions
have sufficient impact on candidates’ chances (and thereby the market price), the rich
could find them more economical than insurance.
2
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consumers’ adaptive response to the uncertainty over wealth that potential redistribution represents, and the response indicated by the literature on financial securities is to hedge by trading. To see that this
response is potentially crucial, consider a situation in which consumers
trade away all the risk, which is clearly possible since aggregate risk is
zero. How would they vote? In anticipation of that, how would they
trade in the first place? And what does this imply for the redistribution
of wealth? The next two sections answer these questions with a simple
but general model.
II.

Model

A.

The Setup

There are two dates, time 0 and time 1. There are two candidates, L
and R, who announce at time 0 what they would do if elected at time
1. There are N consumers who can trade at time 0 and can vote and
consume at time 1. What the consumers can trade is contracts that pay
one if L wins and zero otherwise. They can buy or sell any amount of
this contract. A candidate can propose a redistributive wealth tax that
occurs immediately upon election. The tax applies to postcontract
wealth: a consumer first pays or gets what his contract position dictates,
and then his resulting wealth is redistributed.
Candidate R communicates that he would govern with ideology R and
impose no tax, and L communicates that he would govern with ideology
L and impose a redistributive tax of t (the method of communication
is not modeled here; we take as given that voters learn that the candidates would enact these policies). The time t wealth of consumer c is
wct, and the utility of consumer c over time 1 (postelection, postcontract,
and postdistribution) wealth and ideology I (i.e., the ideology of the
winner) is
uc(wc1) ⫹ vc(I),
where uc 1 0, uc ! 0, and vc(R) ( vc(L) for all c.
The redistributive wealth tax collects t of each consumer’s wealth and
distributes 1/N of the receipts to each consumer. To allow a potential
effect of the tax on real activity, we let dc represent a potentially nonzero,
pretax value change for consumer c. So if L wins, the wealth of consumer
c changes by dc and the total wealth in the economy changes by the sum
of dc across c. We denote the total wealth in the economy if L wins and
¯ stand for per capita
if R wins as W L and W R, respectively, and we let w
¯ So the net redistribution to a conwealth if L wins, that is, W L/N p w.
¯ ⫺ w).
sumer with postcontract wealth w (which includes d) is t(w
All consumers know the total wealth in the economy for both out-
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Fig. 1

comes. Therefore, each consumer can calculate his wealth under both
policies in period 1. Let w L p (w 1L, … , wNL) and w R p (w 1R, … , wNR )
stand for period 1 wealth distribution. Similarly, v p (v 1 , … , vN) denotes
the ideological preferences. At period 0, there is uncertainty about the
collection of all consumers’ ideology, v, wealth distribution (and therefore period 1 wealth distribution, (w L, w R )), and identity of consumers.
This uncertainty is represented by a finite set S of states. Consumers
share a common prior about the true state of the world. Let r stand
for this probability measure on S. Each consumer has private information in the sense that he knows at least his own ideological preference
and wealth. This private information is described by Hc : S r 2 S, a partitional information function. (Given the true state, s 苸 S, consumer c
knows that the true state could be any element of Hc(s).) In addition,
there is residual uncertainty over events that will affect the election
outcome such as turnout, revelations about candidates’ private lives,
wars, recounts, and so on. Let f(d, p, s) be the joint probability distribution describing this residual uncertainty after trading at price p, where
d p 1 if candidate L wins and zero otherwise. Therefore, we can rule
out any trivial setting: At period 0, no consumer can be sure about the
outcome of the election independent of the amount of information he
has, that is, 0 ! f(d p 1Fp, s) ! 1 for all p and s. For further use, let p
stand for the value of this conditional probability when w L p w R. Finally,
we assume that no consumer is negligible in determining the election
outcome: for all c 苸 {1, … , N } and for all s 苸 S and p, we have
f(d p 1FH⫺c(s), Hc(s), p) ( f(d p 1FH⫺c(s), p),
where
H⫺c(s) P {H 1(s), … , Hc⫺1(s), Hc⫹1(s), … , HN(s)}.
We can summarize the model with the following chronology, illustrated in figure 1.
1. Before date 0, consumers learn that L will impose ideology L and
tax t if elected, and R will impose ideology R.
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2. At date 0, consumers trade election-contingent securities; consumer
c buys xc contracts. After trading, there is residual uncertainty over
the election’s outcome.
3. At date 1, (a) consumers vote in the election, and the residual
uncertainty is resolved. (b) If L won, consumer c receives xc from
his contracts and dc from the effect of the tax on real activity. (c)
The winner’s ideology is implemented, and if L won, then consumer
c pays a tax of t times his current wealth and receives t times the
average wealth w̄.

B.

Discussion of Modeling Choices

It would be simpler to solve a model with atomistic, and therefore pricetaking, consumers.5 But while that approximation is acceptable in some
settings, it is inappropriate here because it ruins the incentive to vote.
That is, if a consumer’s trading does not affect prices, then his voting
should not affect the election. So we allow traders to move the market,
in that the market price aggregates traders’ information, though we do
not explicitly model the trading mechanism. We solve for the equilibrium by first positing the existence of a price p ∗ at which there is no
further trade and then solving for p ∗. There could in practice be an
incentive for candidates or their supporters to manipulate the market
price since it can be taken as a de facto poll result (see, e.g., “Iowa
Business School’s Presidential Futures Market Still Too Close to Call,”
CNN Transcript 00110602V62, November 6, 2000). We are abstracting
from that incentive in our analysis.
One potential concern with trading before voting is that the trading
could reveal exactly who wins, so that the price goes to zero or one. To
keep the focus on nontrivial trading outcomes, we assume that there is
sufficient uncertainty over events intervening between trading and voting that the election’s outcome cannot be predicted exactly with information known at trading time. So we do not endogenize the timing of
the trading relative to the arrival of election-relevant news, but it is
intuitive that consumers would want to take their position in electioncontingent securities before a given source of uncertainty taps out, not
after.
Our analysis equates the state {L wins} to the state {L’s policies are
enacted}. These states may not in practice be truly equivalent as a result
of, for example, the competing agendas of other branches of government. In such cases the security is more accurately viewed as policy5
In an earlier version, we show that our main results hold under the assumption of a
continuum of consumers/voters.
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contingent rather than election-contingent. That is, it pays one if and
only if L’s policies are enacted.
We model utility over wealth as separable from utility over ideology.
This is the same approach taken by Dixit and Londregan (1996). It is
not hard to think of campaign positions that relate to both wealth and
ideology, such as federal funding of abortions or even redistribution
itself. We are implicitly analyzing these positions as packages, combining
wealth effects that affect consumers through u and therefore interact
with other wealth effects such as security payoffs and ideological effects
that are felt through v.
Finally, our representation of the effect of taxes on real activity,
through dc, is reduced form and is not intended to be a rigorous analysis
of that problem, which is analyzed extensively elsewhere (e.g., Meltzer
and Richard 1981). The flat wealth tax is an approximation of federal
taxes whose incidence generally increases with personal wealth. It is
functionally equivalent to the linear income tax in Meltzer and Richard
(1981), where voters start with no wealth.
III.

Analysis
∗

Let p be the equilibrium price of a contract. We first take it as given
and then solve for it. If consumer c buys xc contracts, then he pays
xc p ∗ at time 0 and then gets xc pretax in the state {L wins} and nothing
in the state {R wins}. The wealth he consumes is therefore
¯ ⫺ (wc0 ⫺ xc p ∗ ⫹ xc ⫹ dc)] p
wc0 ⫺ xc p ∗ ⫹ xc ⫹ dc ⫹ t[w
¯ ⫹ (1 ⫺ t)[(1 ⫺ p ∗)xc ⫹ wc0 ⫹ dc]
tw
in {L wins} and wc0 ⫺ xc p ∗ in {R wins}. To calculate c’s optimal contract
position, we need the probability he puts to the outcome {L wins}, which
for the moment we call Pc. With this notation, c’s problem is to choose
the xc that maximizes
¯ ⫹ (1 ⫺ t)[(1 ⫺ p ∗)xc ⫹ wc0 ⫹ dc]) ⫹ vc(L)]
Pc[uc(tw
⫹ (1 ⫺ Pc)[uc(wc0 ⫺ xc p ∗) ⫹ vc(R)].
With wcL and wcR representing c’s terminal wealth in {L wins} and {R wins},
respectively, the first-order condition can be written as
Pcuc(wcL)(1 ⫺ t)(1 ⫺ p ∗) p (1 ⫺ Pc)uc(wcR )p ∗.

(1)

If Pc ( 0 and p ∗ ( 1, this can be rewritten as
uc(wcL)
(1 ⫺ Pc)p ∗
p
.

R
uc(wc )
Pc(1 ⫺ t)(1 ⫺ p ∗)

(2)
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Pure Redistribution

We first focus on the pure redistribution case, that is, 冘c dc p 0.
Proposition 1. In the unique equilibrium, all consumers equalize
wealth across the possible electoral outcomes, and the outcome is determined solely by ideology rather than by the distribution of wealth.
Proof. The proof of uniqueness is presented in the Appendix. Here,
we construct an informationally efficient rational expectations equilibrium (REE). In an informationally efficient REE, the equilibrium price
is a sufficient statistic for all private information. Therefore, Pc is the
same for all c. Assume for the moment that 0 ! Pc ! 1 and 0 ! p ∗ ! 1.
The right-hand side of (2) is the same for all c, so all consumers equalize
uc(wcL)/uc(wcR ) to the same number. This number must be one because
if it were greater than one, then everybody would have more wealth in
{R wins} than in {L wins}, and this is not possible because aggregate
wealth is the same in both states. Analogously, the number cannot be
less than one. So it is one, implying wcL p wcR for all c.
With wealth equalized across outcomes, a consumer prefers the outcome {L wins} to {R wins} if and only if vc(L) 1 vc(R). So the probability
of {L wins} is p, which by assumption is strictly between zero and one.
This also implies that 0 ! p ∗ ! 1 because if p ∗ p 1, everyone would be
better off selling more contracts, and if p ∗ p 0, everyone would be better
off buying more. Market clearance follows immediately from lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
The equilibrium contract price is easily inferred.
Lemma 1. The price per contract p ∗ is (p ⫺ pt)/(1 ⫺ pt).
Proof. Set the right-hand side of (2) equal to one and solve for p ∗.
Q.E.D.
Note that p ∗ is always less than p for t 1 0. We can also solve for the
number of contracts purchased.
Lemma 2. Consumer c buys
xc p

(11⫺⫺ptt ) [t(w ⫺ w)¯ ⫺ (1 ⫺ t)d ]
0
c

c

contracts.
Proof. Set w L p w R, plug in the equilibrium value of p ∗, and solve for
xc. Q.E.D.
This can also be written as
xc p

(pp ) [t(w ⫺ w)¯ ⫺ (1 ⫺ t)d ],
∗

0
c

c

which leads to our next major result.
Proposition 2. When consumers trade before voting, the wealth redistribution occurs before the election, is unrelated to the outcome,
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and is the product of the probability that the redistributionist wins when
votes depend only on ideology and the redistribution that would have
occurred without trading if the redistributionist won.
Proof. In both states, wealth equals wc0 ⫺ xc p ∗, which is
wc0 ⫺

(pp ) [t(w ⫺ w)¯ ⫺ (1 ⫺ t)d ]p ,
∗

0
c

∗

c

¯ ⫺ wc0 ) ⫹ (1 ⫺ t)dc]. So the wealth redistribution is
or wc0 ⫹ p[t(w
0
¯ ⫺ wc ) ⫹ (1 ⫺ t)dc] regardless of who wins, and this is p times the
p[t(w
redistribution that would have occurred in {L wins} without trading.
Q.E.D.
This is a big departure from the standard economic analysis of elections. When consumers can trade before voting, the wealth effect of a
candidate’s redistribution plan no longer affects his chances of winning,
but it does affect the resulting redistribution whether or not he wins.
The magnitude of the effect depends on his chances of winning, but
his chances of winning depend solely on his ideological appeal.6 The
wealth effect on the median wealth voter is not relevant. Consumers
can trade wealth but not ideology across states, and this is what happens.
Because it affects the state probabilities, the trade in election-contingent securities is not simply Pareto-improving risk sharing. Poor people
could view it as a coordination problem. The redistributionist might
have been an almost sure thing if wealth distribution influenced voting,
but not with wealth equalized, so the net expected redistribution to
¯ ⫺ wc0 ) ⫹ (1 ⫺ t)dc to p[t(w
¯ ⫺ wc0 ) ⫹
consumer c goes from close to t(w
0
¯ (and dc is small),
(1 ⫺ t)dc]. This is an adverse development if wc ! w
but the consumer is better off trading than not even though he would
be best off if nobody traded. The poor would like to avoid this effect
of trading by coordinating if they could find an incentive-compatible
mechanism that implements their preferred no-trade outcome distribution. A constitutional amendment or referendum banning electioncontingent trade may serve this purpose (though this vote would itself
be susceptible to hedging).
1.

Strategic Policy Choices

So far we have not specified a set of preferences for the candidates, but
rather taken their policy choices as given and analyzed the consumers’
reaction. However, if candidates care about the enacted policies (both
6
Our results do not depend on a perfect hedge. If we instead assume that the contract
pays off in the wrong state (i.e., R wins) with probability e, we can show numerically with
specific utility and distributional assumptions that the resulting equilibrium converges to
the one solved here as e r 0 (results available on request).
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ideological and redistributive), they will strategize over their policy
choices. Maximizing expected utility, each candidate must consider a
policy’s electability as well as its desirability. Let UL(t, I, d) denote the
preference of candidate L.7 We assume that there exists a redistribution
tˆ L such that UL(tˆ L , I, d) 1 UL(t , I, d) for all t  ( tˆ L and for all I and d.
The preference of candidate R is analogous, and to simplify, we assume
that candidate R prefers no redistribution, that is, t̂R p 0. Prior to trading, each candidate announces a tax rate and an ideological policy.8 We
further assume that candidates can commit to policies and negative
redistribution is not possible, that is, t ≥ 0. At the time candidates announce policies, they know that the election will depend solely on v
because of backward induction, and their utilities can increase with their
odds of winning because of either the effect on net distribution (as
argued in the previous proposition), the direct utility from winning, or
the chances of implementing their ideologies. Therefore, each may
prefer to announce more moderate ideological policies in order to
increase the probability of winning and maximize expected utility. On
the other hand, the choice of tax rate will have no effect on the outcome
of the election. However, we have shown that the tax rate will affect the
wealth distribution independently of who wins, so to cause the redistribution that tax rate t̂L causes in the absence of trading, candidate L
commits to a tax rate higher than t̂L.9
Proposition 3. When candidates choose their policies strategically,
candidate L chooses a tax rate that causes more gross redistribution
than the amount of net redistribution that L prefers or expects.
The proof follows immediately from the previous proposition and the
fact that p ! 1.

B.

Economic Efficiency

The propositions to this point all assume that 冘c dc p 0, that is, no aggregate real effect of the tax. We can allow for an aggregate real effect
by relaxing this assumption. In this case we can no longer peg the righthand side of (2) at a given number, but we can establish whether it is
greater or less than one, which allows us to relate the aggregate effect
to wealth preferences.
Proposition 4. When consumers trade before voting and aggregate
7
Note that candidate L’s utility is not a function of dc ; thus he is indifferent over
individual wealth effects and cares only about the aggregate redistribution. This simplifies
our next proposition.
8
Implicitly, we assume that there exists a set of possible policies that contains R and L.
9
With no hedging possibilities, Roemer (1998) shows that a leftist candidate proposes
a lower redistribution (possibly zero) when two candidates compete in a two-dimensional
policy space.
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wealth depends on who wins, all consumers expect after trading to have
more wealth if the higher-wealth candidate wins.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let {R wins} be the higher-wealth state.
In an informationally efficient REE, the right-hand side is the same
value for all consumers. This value must be greater than one because
if it were less than or equal to one, then all consumers would have more
wealth (or the same, respectively) in {L wins} than they do in {R wins},
both of which are not possible. With the right-hand side greater than
one, all consumers have more wealth in {R wins}. Q.E.D.
So the wealth effect is strictly in the direction of the higher-wealth
candidate. The resulting effect on the probability that this candidate
wins depends on the relative strength of ideological preferences. In the
intuitive case in which aggregate wealth decreases as t increases, L decreases his probability of winning (with ideologies held constant) as he
increases t. In this case, L chooses a higher tax rate in economies in
which leftist ideology is widely popular: higher taxes destroy more
wealth, so all consumers have less wealth; but L can afford this loss of
voters’ wealth as long as they have sufficiently high vc(L) relative to
vc(R). On the other hand, if there is no ideological difference between
the candidates, so that vc(R) p vc(L) for all c, we get the stronger result
that consumers trade to the point at which they all want the higherwealth candidate to win.
Corollary 1. When consumers trade before voting and aggregate
wealth depends on who wins but utility from ideology does not, then
after trading, all consumers prefer that the higher-wealth candidate win.
The frictionless trading opportunity biases the election toward the
outcome with greater real activity.
IV.

Summary and Conclusion

An election creates wealth risk, and a securities market reallocates wealth
risk. The wealth risk created by an election with redistribution at stake
is well suited for trade in that demand naturally equals supply. If one
candidate would redistribute (but not create or destroy) wealth with a
linear tax and this trade is frictionlessly available, the result is a transformed election, with wealth considerations separated completely from
voting decisions and redistribution separated completely from the election’s outcome. These results constitute a baseline case for arguments
that redistribution buys votes or that the amount of redistribution depends on the election’s outcome. For those arguments to go through,
there must be some departure from our assumptions, such as transactions costs, incomplete markets, or effects of taxation on aggregate
wealth. When we introduce an effect on aggregate wealth, we find that
all consumers, after trade, expect more wealth in the higher-wealth state.
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Today’s markets depart from the idealized trade in our analysis with
their positive transactions costs, imperfect hedges, and position limits.
So one perspective on our results is that they warn of consequences
from eliminating these frictions. Trade in Arrow-Debreu state-contingent securities might seem obviously Pareto-improving, but when state
probabilities are endogenous, this is no longer clear. Elections are just
one, well-defined, example of this endogeneity; the point applies more
generally.
Another perspective on the results is that consumers’ financial exposures to an election have qualitatively different implications for the
outcome and net effect of the election than their other exposures do.
Financial exposure can be traded across states, and risk aversion encourages this trade. So elections determine wealth redistribution differently from the way they determine other policies at stake, raising the
question as to whether they are equally efficient at resolving distributional and ideological disputes.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we shall first define the equilibrium concept and recall the
definition of common knowledge. Second, we shall prove the uniqueness of
equilibrium.
Definition A1. Price p ∗(H 1(s), … , HN(s)) is an equilibrium if the following
conditions hold:
1. At t p 1, each consumer votes to maximize his expected utility given his
postelection wealth, w1c , and ideology, vc(7).
2. At t p 0, each consumer chooses his demand xc(p, H c(s)) to maximize expected utility assuming that the probability Pc is given by f(d p 1Fp p p ∗,
Hc(s)), where f(d p 1, p ∗, H 1(s), … , HN(s)) is the true joint probability distribution given p ∗(H 1(s), … , HN(s)) and optimal voting at t p 1.
3. Given consumers’ demands, p ∗(H 1(s), … , HN(s)) is market clearing for all
realizations of consumers’ private information.
Definition A2. An event F P S is self-evident between consumers c and c  if
for all s 苸 F we have Hc(s) and Hc (s) P F. An event E P S is common knowledge
between consumers c and c  in state s if there is a self-evident event F for which
s 苸 F P E.
Lemma A1. There exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. We prove our claim in two steps. First, we show that the full information
economy has a unique equilibrium. This result implies that there can be at most
one informationally efficient REE. Second, we show that there are no partially
revealing or nonrevealing REE.
In a full information economy, Pc is the same for all consumers. Furthermore,
Pc is strictly between zero and one by the residual uncertainty assumption. Therefore, equation (2) must hold for every equilibrium of the full information economy. However, this implies the equilibrium characterized by proposition 1. This
concludes the first step.
Now we proceed with the second step that there are no partially revealing or
nonrevealing REE. Suppose not. Then there is an equilibrium price p  that is
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not informationally efficient. Equation (2) must hold for this equilibrium as
well given the residual uncertainty assumption. If each consumer has equalized


wealth across states, w L p w R, then (1 ⫺ Pc)p/[P
c(1 ⫺ t)(1 ⫺ p )] p 1 for all c.

This implies that Pc p p/[(1
⫺ t)(1 ⫺ p  ) ⫹ p  ] for all c. However, Pc cannot be
the same for all c given that at least one consumer has private information.


Therefore, the only possibility left is (1 ⫺ Pc)p/[P
c(1 ⫺ t)(1 ⫺ p )] ( 1 for at least
one consumer. Therefore, there exists at least one consumer, say c, who has not
equalized wealth across states. Without loss of generality, assume that this consumer has more wealth if L wins. From the market clearance condition, there
must exist another consumer, say c , who has more wealth if R wins. Therefore,
uc(wcL) uc (wcL )
!
.
uc(wcR ) uc (wcR )
Consequently, from equation (2), we must have Pc 1 Pc , that is, f(d p
1FHc(s)) 1 f(d p 1FHc (s)). Market clearance also implies that this inequality is common knowledge among these two consumers. (Equivalently, we say that event
E p {s 苸 SFf(d p 1FHc(s)) 1 f(d p 1FHc (s))}
is common knowledge.) In the rest of the proof we shall show that common
knowledge of such a disagreement cannot occur in equilibrium. Given that the
event f(d p 1FHc(s)) 1 f(d p 1FHc (s)) is common knowledge, there must be an
event F 苹 s that is a subset of E and is a union of members of the information
partitions of both consumers, that is, ws苸F [Hc(s) ∪ Hc (s)] p F P E. Given that
f(d p 1FHc(s)) 1 f(d p 1FHc (s)) is common knowledge for all s 苸 F, this inequality
f(d p 1FHc(s)) 1 f(d p 1FHc (s)) must hold for all s 苸 F. Therefore, we have

冘
s苸F

r(s)f(d p 1FHc(s)) 1

冘

r(s)f(d p 1FHc (s)).

s苸F

But since F is a union of members of each consumer’s information partition,
both sides of this inequality are equal to r(F )f(d p 1FF ). However, this contradicts
the inequality above and concludes the second part of the proof. Therefore,
neither partially revealing nor nonrevealing equilibria can exist. Q.E.D.
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